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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
DELEGATIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
UNDER THE N. I. R. A. AND THE A. A. A.*
INTRODUCTION
It is necessary, at the outset, to qualify this discussion of dele-
gation of legislative power to administrative agencies under the
N. I. R. A.' and the A. A. A.2 It is highly doubtful for one thing,
if the precedents will avail much in attempts to predict the con-
stitutional status of these acts. Manifestly the amount of work
done and the success of those efforts up to the time the test cases
reach the Supreme Court, and the consequences of declaring the
codes, licenses, and marketing agreements unconstitutional, will
influence that court in its decision. The declaration that "a na-
tional emergency productive of widespread unemployment and
disorganization of industry . . . is declared to exist"3 may in
itself furnish the basis for sustaining the validity of the recovery
legislation upon the unusual grounds of emergency.
It is advisable, further, to eliminate the question as to whether
or not there is, in a realistic sense, a delegation of legislative
power. For that would not settle the question. It would be diffi-
cult to assert that allowing administrative officers to regulate
future activities in forest preserves 4 or to suspend tariff pro-
visions and substitute new ones5 is not to permit them to legislate.
The analysis here will be confined to the question of whether the
delegations are proper within the doctrine of previously decided
Federal cases.
HISTORY
The constitutional law principle that the legislature cannot
delegate its powers to the executive department has no basis in
express language of the Constitution, but derives "largely from
the language of the Constitution . . . by which legislative
power is vested in the legislative body, or on the proposition that
the government is a representative democracy wherein the peo-
ple have divested themselves of all legislative power and cannot
resume it without a change in the fundamental law."0 It is a
corollary of the theory of separation of powers.
*.A recent note on the constitutional problems involved in the recovery
legislation, including the delegation of legislative power, appears in
(Nov. 1933) 47 Harvard Law Review 93.1 Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 191,15 U. S. C. A. 701 (Supp. 1933).
2 Act of May 12, 1933, 48 Stat. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. 601 (Supp. 1933).
aN. I. R. A., sec. 1.
4 United States v. Grimaud (1911) 220 U. S. 506.
5 Field v. Clark (1892) 143 U. S. 649.
6 See: Duff and Whiteside, Delegation of Power (1929) 14 Cornell LawQuarterly 168, for a discussion of the general theory and history of delegation.
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The first venture of Congress into the debatable field of legis-
lative delegation of power, was in 1794, when President Wash-
ington was given the power, when in his opinion public safety
should so require, "to lay an embargo on vessels and revoke the
same whenever he shall think proper.' 7 This statute was never
questioned as delegating the legislative power to the executive.
The first controversy to reach the Supreme Court was the
Brig Aurora case, which involved the power of Congress to make
the revival of the Non-Intercourse Acts of March 1, 1809, depend
upon a proclamation of the President that Great Britain and
France had not revoked or modified certain edicts which violated
rights of American neutrality.8 Although counsel for the appel-
lant contended in this case that to make the revival of a law de-
pend upon the President's proclamation is to give that proclama-
tion the force of law, and so to transfer legislative power to the
President, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Johnson, declared that it could see no reason why the legislature
could not revive the acts "either expressly or conditionally, as
their judgment shall direct."9 In the opinion there is no considera-
tion of the later developed rule against delegation of the legis-
lative power.
It was in the case of Field v. Clark'0 that Mr. Justice Harlan
declared the doctrine against legislative delegation in the form
now recognized, although the court held in that case that an act
giving the President the power to suspend tariff provisions relat-
ing to free introduction of certain foreign commodities if he
found foreign levies to be "reciprocally unequal and unreason-
able" was not a delegation of legislative power." It was stated
in the opinion that not only had Congress laid down an intelligible
rule for the executive to follow, but that "the true distinction is
between delegation of power to make a law, which necessarily in-
volves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pur-
suance of the law."
Since the decision in Field v. Clark, which was decided in 1892,
the Supreme Court, in the cases in which the question of delega-
tion has arisen, has been content to state the quoted principle,
only for the purpose of asserting its inapplicability to the par-
ticular case in controversy. In First National Bank v. Union
Trust Company,' 2 the Court said, "The contention that the au-
7 1 Stat. 372.
'Aurora v. United States (1813) 7 Cranch 382.
'Ibid., 1. c. 388.
10 N. 5, above.
U Ibid., 1. c. 653; quoted from Cincinnati, W. and Z. R. R. Co. v. Clinton
County Commissioners (1852) 1 Ohio St. 88.
12 (1917) 244 U. S. 416.
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thority was void because of conferring legislative power on a
board (in this case the Federal Reserve Board) is so plainly ad-
versely disposed of by many previous adjudications as to cause
it to be necessary only to refer to them." In the Selective Draft
Cases, the Supreme Court asserted that "the contention has been
so completely adversely settled as to require reference only to
some of the decided cases."18 The most recent case in which the
problem was considered at any length is Hampton & Co. v. United
States (1928), which involved the "flexible tariff" clause of the
Tariff Act of 1922.14 Quoting the rule announced in Field v. Clark,
the Court proceeded to show that the discretion of the executive
was only as to facts which Congress had not the ability to de-
termine, and that to deny Congress the power to make such a dele-
gation would be to deny it the means to make effective its express
authority over foreign trade.
From the standpoint of execution of the delegated functions,
the legislation may be placed into two categories. On the one
hand there is the type of delegation in which the enforcement of
a law depends upon fact-finding by an executive. 15 The Brig
Aurora case, above quoted, is illustrative of this. On the other
hand, there is the type in which the Congressional Act is to be
amplified by executive rules and regulations whose formulation
involves an exercise of discretion. Such a case was United States
v. Grimaud, which considered legislation providing for the estab-
lishment and improvement of forest reserves by the Secretary
of Agriculture, who had power under the law to make necessary
regulations to effectuate the legislative purpose.1 (
NECESSARY ELEMENTS
The first thing that an Act of Congress of the sort here in ques-
tion must do is to indicate from its language a policy or purpose
for delegation. When the delegation is of fact-finding no diffi-
culty is involved because the Supreme Court has been willing to
concede that the executive may be required to determine when a
situation calls for measures designated in the law (as a change in
attitude towards violation of neutral rights).17 But by judicial
interpretation it seems that no demand is made for a more definite
purpose in general delegations. The Supreme Court has held that
'a United States v. Stephens (1918) 247 U. S. 504.
1.4 276 U. S. 394.
15 See, Note (1933) 31 Michigan Law Review 786 for a detailed case
analysis.
1 The regulation involved in the Grimaud case, n. 4, above, was a prohi-
bition against grazing of sheep on certain forest reserves without a govern-
ment permit.
17 Aurora v. United State, n. 8, above.
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the "elimination of undesirable residents of the United States" is
standard enough for the Secretary of Labor to act in deporting
aliens ;"' that the freeing of navigation from unreasonable ob-
structions arising from defective bridges is sufficient to give
such power to the Secretary of War ;19 that the fixing of reason-
able rates to be charged by interstate carriers is a power delegable
to a commission ;20 that the standard of "public interest" is suffi-
cient to allow the Interstate Commerce Commission to approve
acquisition of control of one carrier by another. 21
In the second category, other general criteria are defined be-
yond which the executive may not go. In the Grimaud case, the
Secretary of Agriculture could make rules to insure the "objects
of such reservations; namely, regulate their occupancy and use,
and preserve forests thereon from destruction. ' 22 Usually be-
fore the executive establishes any regulation (as tariff changes)
he is required to provide an opportunity for interested parties to
be heard.2 3
SHIFT OF EMPHASIS
It is apparent from a survey of these cases that there is a re-
markable tendency to shift emphasis from the theory of delega-
tion to necessity for delegation. This fact is obviously important
to the N. I. R. A. and A. A. A. because in these acts the need for
concentrated authority and power is manifest. One writer has
reached the extremity of saying that the question is not whether
there is an unlawful delegation, but whether it was Congress'
duty to delegate in the specific case. 24 There are, it seems, two
reasons for this tendency. One is that "In order to legislate in-
telligently and in detail members of Congress individually must
know more things and know them more accurately and inti-
mately than is humanly possible;"25 the other, that legislation
has to depend often on certain contingencies, as in the Hampton
case, which are likely to occur during a time when the legislature
is not in a position to function, or to function rapidly. It would
be difficult to assert that these two factors do not characterize
28 United States v. Williams (1904) 194 U. S. 279.
IV Union Bridge Co. v. United States (1907) 204 U. S. 364.
20 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich (1912) 224 U. S. 194.
21 In Securities Corporation v. United States (1932) 224 U. S. 194, it was
said, with reference to "public interest" that "it is a mistaken assumption
that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to
guide determinations."
22 United States v. Grimaud, n. 4, above; 1. c. 507.
2
, Hampton v. United States, n. 14, above.
24Cheadle, Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 Yale Law
Journal 892.
25 Ibid., 1. c. 892.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss1/10
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
the problems which the N. I. R. A. and A. A. A. are calculated to
meet.
Consequently, although the Supreme Court has not explicitly
recognized this change, the formula announced in Field v. Clark,
as Handler suggests, ". . . is an empty one. Actually every
delegation by Congress, no matter how broad, has been sustained
by the courts. ' 28 If the "elimination of undesirable residents of
the United States" furnishes a sufficiently definite criterion for
the Secretary of Labor to follow, it is difficult to conceive of any
basis more indefinite on which to overthrow a delegation.27
POLICY OF CONGRESS UNDER THE N. I. R. A. AND A. A. A.
The most significant difference between the delegations in the
N. I. R. A. and A. A. A. from previous delegations, is in their
vastly increased scope and extent. Practically all the delega-
tions included find some basis of precedent to sustain them indi-
vidually. Unquestionably, because of the need to relieve grave
economic distress, Congress has gone far in placing authority in
the hands of a few in an attempt to cope with depression problems.
The general policy of Congress in conferring power on the
President under the N. 1. R. A. is declared to be "to remove ob-
structions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce
. . .; and to provide for the general welfare" by organizing
industry and trade groups for cooperative action, elimination of
unfair competitive practices, and increasing both purchasing
power and employment. 28 Similar purposes are outlined in the
A. A. A. to establish a balance between production and consump-
tion of agricultural commodities, to provide favorable marketing
conditions, to reestablish an agricultural purchasing power, and
to extend foreign markets.29 It seems apparent that so far as the
declaration of legislative policy is concerned, Congress has pro-
vided a declaration that is tenable within the purview of the past
Supreme Court decisions. As previously indicated, this is as
definite as the Secretary of Agriculture's power over forest
reservations "to improve and protect forests within reservations
and secure favorable conditions of water flows,"o3 or the Inter-
state Commerce Commission's power over the distribution of
coal "in the case of emergencies.S31 More specific guides, as will
be shown, are laid down for particular delegations.
26Handler, National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) 18 American Bar
Ass'n Journal 440; 1. c. 446.2 7 Avent v. United States (1924) 266 U. S. 127.
28 N. I. R. A., sections 1 and 3.
29 A. A. A., sec. 2.
30 United States v. Grimaud, n. 4, above.
31 Avent v. United States, n. 27, above.
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For purposes of convenience and clarity, it is better to under-
take an examination of the specific delegations to which Congress
has resorted by classifying them into several categories. While
these necessarily are not wholly separable, three clear divisions
are: (1) Powers of providing administrative agencies and
processes; (2) powers operating directly upon private persons,
partnerships, and corporations; (3) powers operating by means
of penalties for violation of administrative rules and regulations.
POWERS AFFECTING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES
Under the first classification there is little judicial authority
upon the power of Congress to authorize the executive to prescribe
the comprehensive administrative scheme. Under the N. I. R. A.
the "President is . . . authorized to establish such agencies,
. . to appoint, without regard to provisions of civil service
laws, such officers and employees . . . as he may find neces-
sary, to prescribe their . . . duties, and tenure," and to fix
their compensation as he may see fit, to effectuate the policy of the
Act.82 He may delegate any of his functions and powers to offi-
cers and research agencies to help carry out his functions.33
A somewhat analogous situation was presented by the Recon-
struction Acts during the post-Civil War days when President
Johnson, by act of Congress, was given power to establish mili-
tary government in the Southern states.34 The Supreme Court
in cases involving these statutes held the question of delegation
to be a political one and without the cognizance of the judiciary-
particularly since no property rights were involved. In other
cases considering delegation of the legislative power on the
"necessity" basis, Congress was held to be "compelled to leave to
executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed
out by the statute."' 5 If broad delegations of this type can be
sustained, nothing prevents authorization of a further delega-
tion of power by the President to administrative agencies estab-
lished by him.
Similar to the President's power outlined above, is that of the
Secretary of Agriculture under the A. A. A. He "may appoint
such officers and employees, . . . and such experts as are neces-
sary to execute the functions vested in him by this title" with-
out regard to the civil service laws or regulations.36 He has certain
:2 N. I. R. A., sec. 2(a).
"N. I. R. A., sec. 2 (b).
,Mississippi v. Johnson (1867) 4 Wall. 475.
"Buttfield v. Stranahan (1903) 192 U. S. 470, 1. c. 496. In the statute
under consideration the Secretary of the Treasury was given authority to
exclude importation of impure tea.
36 A. A. A., see. 8.
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other criteria which he must observe. Salaries are limited to
$10,000; provisions of the Classification Act of 1923 must be fol-
lowed.3 7 To avoid any technical conflict which may arise in the
administration of the two Acts, Congress has given the President
the further power to delegate any of his functions under the
N. I. R. A. to the Secretary of Agriculture.38
The other delegation of this type is given the Federal Emer-
gency Administrator of Public Works under section 201 of the
N. I. R. A., who is empowered to institute an administration
whose function it is to prepare a comprehensive program of public
works. For criteria, projects are included "among other
things"39 for highway construction and repairs, public buildings,
conservation of resources on land and water, and drainage im-
provements.40 Financing to carry out the public works pre-
scribed is an incidental power to the program itself.41 The neces-
sity of experienced agencies to investigate and prepare plans, the
profound effect in providing labor for unemployed, and the ex-
tent to which work on these approved programs has been carried,
seem to militate against the possibility of a judicial declaration
of unconstitutionality so far as public works are concerned.
POWERS AFFECTING INDIVIDUALS
It is under this second classification that the government has
come to affect, more intimately than ever before, the activities of
the industrial organizations. Here are found the powers relat-
ing to codes, licenses, oil regulation, and finance.
By virtue of his power to prescribe "codes of fair competition,"
the President in effect, may control the actions of industries
whose activities affect interstate commerce. However, the Presi-
dent has to be limited by a number of criteria sufficiently definite
that "he can carry out the legislative will."142 Before approving
a code, the President must be satisfied of the following conditions:
(1) That all interested groups have a right to be heard in
forming the code.43 This has been accomplished through
the appearance of parties representing private interests,
who are interested in a particular code, and through the de-
velopment of government agencies, including the Labor
Board, the Consumers' Board, and the Producers' Board.
These agencies were established under the law by the Presi-
dent and his Administrator to advise them with respect to
industrial conditions which might affect the provisions of
any code.
37A. A. A., sec. 10 (a). 41 N. I. R. A., sections 204 and 205.
38 N. I. R. A., sec. 8(b). 42 Mahler v. Eby (1924) 264 U. S. 32.
39 N. I. R. A., sec. 202. 43 N. I. R. A., sec. 3 (a).
40 N. I. R. A., sec. 202.
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(2) That the code is "not designed to promote monopolies
or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises." 44
(3) That the code effectuates the policy of the Act.45
(4) That: "Associations submitting codes impose no in-
equitable restrictions on admission to membership" and rep-
resent their trade.46
(5) That the code, as submitted, contains the basic labor
provisions outlined in the Act.47
All these limitations are general in nature, but necessarily so,
because each industrial group requires specific attention to meet
its needs. Congress cannot be expected to be acquainted with
conditions in each trade, large or small, to the extent that it could
rationally prescribe its hours of labor, its wages, etc. Much
difficulty is avoided by making these agreements voluntary;48
nevertheless, if any industry is operating contrary "to the public
interest" and policy of the act, the President, upon his own mo-
tion, "may prescribe and approve a code of fair competition for
such trade or industry . . ., which shall have the same effect"
as any voluntary code,49 subject to a few incidental limitations.
The President, however, can do this only when there has been
given an opportunity for public notice and hearing (as in the
case of the oil and steel industries).5o It is highly probable that
the Supreme Court will first adjudicate the constitutionality of
the N. I. R. A. through considering those disputes arising from
the imposition of an involuntary code. Assuming that Congress
itself has the power to regulate industry in the manner attempted
in the codes (a separate constitutional question), the criteria
seem definite enough to meet any requirements the Supreme Court
has established. This would not seem to be a delegation of legis-
lative power "in any real sense"51 or "in any real constitutional
sense." 52 To deny the validity of the delegation would be to deny
Congress efficacious means to execute its power.
Resting upon the same constitutional bases as the code pro-
visions are the licensing powers of the President under the
N. I. R. A.5 3 Whenever he finds destructive wage or price cutting
"or other activities contrary to the policy of the Act," "after such
4, N. I. R. A., sec. 3 (a).
45 N. I. R. A., see. 3 (a).
N. I. R. A., sec. 7(a).
4T N. I. R. A., sec. 7(a).
48 N. I. R. A., sec. 3(a); see. 4(a).
" N. I. R. A., sec. 3(d) sec. 7(c).
50 N. I. R. A., see. 3(d) ;sec. 7(c).
61 Field v. Clark, n. 5, above.
52 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, n. 19, above. See, Wickersham,
Delegation of Power to Legislate (1925) 11 Virginia Law Review 183.
59 N. I. R. A., see. 4 (b).
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public notice and hearing as he shall specify," he can, as a con-
dition to continuing a trade or industry, require it to obtain a
license.54 He may require importers to be licensed. 55
The President may "from time to time cancel or modify any
order, approval, license, rule, or regulation issued under this
title."5 6 This is not different from the previously discussed tariff
or forest reserve delegations. In fact, the Act requires the code,
license, or other agreements to contain an express provision for
modification. If, then, he can establish codes, by virtue of those
same codes so providing, he can modify them.
Section 9 (a) of the N. L R. A. adds pipe lines of oil companies
to the list of carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The President may "initiate before the
Commission proceedings necessary to prescribe regulations to
control the operations of oil pipe lines and to fix reasonable
rates."5 7 The power of rate regulation has never been denied to
the Interstate Commerce Commission in previous cases involving
interstate carriers, because "if Congress were required to fix
every rate, it would be impossible to exercise the power at all."
Therefore, the appointment of a commission is dictated by "com-
mon sense."
'58
The delegations under the A. A. A. to the Secretary of Agri-
culture can be justified in the same manner as can the delega-
tions to the President under the N. I. R. A. It is sufficient to list
them, as illustrative of the desire of Congress, or rather the Con-
gressionally enforced desire of the President for centralized con-
trol as the means for meeting the problems of recovery.
The Secretary of Agriculture can enter marketing agreements
with processors and producers after due hearing to interested
parties ;59 issue processing licenses ;6o require licensees to make
any reports he deems necessary ;61 and levy a processing tax upon
"the first domestic processing of the commodity, whether of do-
mestic production or imported."62 It is of interest to note that
in the case of the processing tax there is a combination of the fact-
finding type of delegation of legislative power and the more dis-
cretionary type. The Secretary of Agriculture can appoint his
aids to help him administer the powers delegated; but detailed
provisions as to exchange value, base period, index numbers, and
54 N. I. R. A., sec. 4 (b).
55 N. I. R. A., sec. 3 (e).
56 N. I. R. A., sec. 10 (b).
57 N. I. R. A., sec. 9 (a).
58 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich, n. 20, above.
5 A. A. A., sec. 8 (2).
80A. A. A., sec. 8(3).
61A. A. A., see. 8 (4).
A. A. A., sec. 9 (a).
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the like, are explicitly required of him to guide him in determin-
ing the amount of the tax.63 Congress' partial delegation in the
case of the processing tax of its power over interstate commerce
is a parallel to Congress' sustained partial delegation of its ex-
clusive tariff power. Although the Secretary of Agriculture
may suspend the tax if it is, in his judgment, harmful to a basic
agricultural commodity, the discretion here is only as to the
execution of the law.64
At the present writing, delegation to the President and Secre-
tary of the Treasury, under Title III of the A. A. A., of the power
of Congress to coin money and to regulate its value, has become
the subject of nation-wide discussion in controversies relative to
the gold regulations and the "commodity dollar." 65 The purpose
of this particular delegation is "to expand credit."66 The Presi-
dent may fix the weight of gold in the dollar ;67 accept silver in
payment of foreign debts ;68 and issue new currency.69
POWERS OVER PENAL OFFENSES
The third type of delegation, defining offenses, has received
judicial sanction often, and deserves only a brief treatment. The
two recovery acts provide penalties for the violation of codes, 70
oil regulations7 1 processing regulations, 7 2 public works regula-
tions,7 8 employees' speculation regulations, 74 and falsification on
application for a loan.75 As pointed out in the Grimaud case, if
Congress prescribes the punishment, the courts will inflict it.76
And further, if Congress expressly provides that a breach of any
of the rules and regulations of the administrative officers in
charge is subject to the prescribed penalty, the legislation is not
violative of any constitutional principles. 77 Consequently, if the
Supreme Court holds the delegations lawful, no difficulty with
penal regulations may be anticipated.
PHILIP RASHBAUM, '34.
0A. A. A., see. 9(a), (b), (c), (d).
"As determined in the Hampton case, n. 14, above.
65Title III of the A. A. A. reads: "Title III-Financing-and Exercising
Power Conferred by Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution; to Coin Money
and to Regulate the Value Thereof."
A. A. A., sec. 43 (4).
V A. A. A., sec. 43 (b) (2).
", A. A. A., sec. 45 (a).
6" A. A. A., sec. 43(b) (1).
70 N. I. R. A., see. 3(f) ; sec. 10(a).
71 N. I. R. A., sec. 9 (c).
72 N. I. R. A., sec. 207(b) ; see. 209.
78 A. A. A., see. 10 (c).
74 A. A. A., sec. 10 (g).
75 A. A. A., sec. 35.
76 See also the earlier case of United States v. Eaton (1892) 144 U. S. 677.
77 United States v. Grimaud, n. 4, above; 1. c. 521.
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